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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 18/05/2006

Accident number: 268

Accident time: 08:31

Accident Date: 16/11/1998

Where it occurred: Homoine Village,
Homoine District,
Inhambane Province

Country: Mozambique

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Missed-mine accident
ID original source: IND 372/ADP-11

Date of main report: 17/11/1998
Name of source: ADP/CND/IND

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: PMN AP blast

Ground condition: bushes/scrub
sandy
soft
sparse trees

Date record created: 18/02/2004

Date last modified: 18/02/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: UTM 36 k

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east: 7-23-8 E

Map north: 73-55-3N

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate area marking (?)
pressure to work quickly (?)
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?)
inadequate equipment (?)
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Accident report
An Accident report was prepared by the demining group in the format required by the National
Authorities and made available by the demining group in November 2000. The format is
restrictive. The following summarises its content.
The weather at the time of the accident was "sunny, fine". The victim was born in 1964, so
was around 34 years old. He had completed the basic UNUMOZ/MCTC demining course.
The demining platoon had been at the ring minefield since September 1977. The last mine
found at the site had been found and destroyed in-situ on the previous Friday. All mines found
at the site were at a depth between 6 and 10 cms [it is not clear whether this is the distance to
the top of the mine]. The ground was soft and sandy with low metal contamination.
On Monday 16th November 1998, the deminer went into the clearance lane at 08:10 for the
third time. Up to the time of the accident (08:31) he had cleared about 25 square meters,
which were marked. The victim was warned to expect another mine in line with the previous
find and told to be careful.
"There are clear hints that he entered the uncleared area to a length of 5.3m along the tape of
the left hand side. He entered also the area where should be the next lane. The distance from
the left marking (tape) to the accident place is 2.15m. The accident place could not be
reached by detector from the last marked safe place in the clearance lane as well as from the
cleared area. After the explosion the legs of the injured person were laying in the uncleared
area. His right neighbour cleared the area around the body to have access for evacuation to a
safe area where the paramedic gave first aid…" within "2-3" minutes of the accident.
The victim suffered amputation of the right leg above the knee and the left leg below the knee,
traumatic amputation of the index finger of his right hand 1cm from the hand, open fractures
on the third and fourth fingers of his right hand, minor wounds in his face and forearms, burns
in the face and upper chest excluding the parts covered by his safety glasses.
The victim's hat, trowel, safety glasses, overalls and gloves were damaged.
The victim was driven by ambulance to hospital, arriving after 70 minutes.
It was found that the deminer had cleared 25 square metres within 20 minutes which was "a
very high clearance speed". It also "appeared" that he had cleared a further 7.4 square
metres without marking his work.
The victim's detector and "pruning shears" were found in the unmarked area. The crater of the
mine that detonated was clearly outside the marked area. Parts of a PMN and the handle of
the victim's trowel were found in the crater. The crater of the previous destroyed mine and the
one in the accident were a similar size and 30cm deep.
The position of the detector was thought to imply that either the victim was on his way back to
the marked area when the mine detonated or the detector was thrown in that direction by the
blast. The [Schiebel] detector was not marked by the detonation. The victim's pruning shears
were in the back pocket of his overalls.
The left side of the lane was properly marked but the right side not. The victim's tool roll was a
meter ahead of "the safety sticks".
After the accident, the victim's hat and "the main part" of his safety glasses were found in a
tree. The other part of the safety glass was found in a bush at a height of 1.8 metres.
Five minutes prior to the accident the Section Commander had visited the lane and the victim
had been working inside the marked area. To told the victim to cut the bushes on the right
hand side of his lane and went to check the safety distances between the lanes. The accident
occurred seconds before he was scheduled to signal the deminers to change roles (resting
and working). At the time of the accident no one could see the victim.
The victim confirmed that he had "cleared and marked up to the tree in front of his lane. He
declared that he had got a reading by the detector and that the mine was very deep when he
had hit it with a trowel”.
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Conclusions
”The victim entered the unmarked area with his detector and cleared about 30 square metres
in 20 minutes which is an [extraordinary] speed. The average [speed] per deminer the
previous week was 69 square metres per day. It may be presumed that he wanted to finish
his working time with finding a mine."
The victim breached SOPs by entering the unmarked area and did not use a prodder before
using his trowel. The section commander should have seen that the victim was working
ahead of his marking and that his order to cut the bushes was not obeyed.
During the investigation "certain negligence" about movement on the site between rest areas
was noticed.

Recommendations
Each site should have an easily understandable briefing "form" for daily and weekly briefings.
Deminer refresher training should be reviewed, along with the fine system for all "levels in
charge". The supervision in the field must concentrate more on the details to ensure a
knowledge of safety rules, marking, cutting vegetation, use of tools, and movement on the
site.

Victim Report
Victim number: 342

Name: Name removed

Age: 35

Gender: Male

Status: deminer

Fit for work: yes

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: 1 hour 10 minutes

Protection issued: Safety spectacles

Protection used: safety spectacles

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
minor Arms
minor Body
minor Chest
minor Face
severe Eye
severe Hand
severe Leg
AMPUTATION/LOSS
Leg Above knee
Fingers
Eye
COMMENT
See medical report.
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Medical report
A report from the Legal and Medical Safety Services of the Health Ministry at Maputo Central
Hospital was made available in November 2000. It was in Portuguese and signed by Doctor
[name removed] (specialist in Legal Medicine and Safety) dated 10th February 1999. The
following summarises its translated content.
The victim was 35 years old.

Information on the victim
It was noted that on 16th November 1998 while doing demining work in Homoine the victim
activated an anti-personnel mine, being injured on the left leg, torso and on the right arm. He
did not lose consciousness at the time of the accident.
From the accident site he was taken to Chicuque Rural Hospital where he received first aid,
being later transferred to Maputo Central Hospital where he was detained for approximately
two months.
He suffers from anorexia, weakness and at times anxiety and depression: pain on the torso
scars and the limbs; cannot use the right arm (or hand) to write or wash himself; pain on the
point of amputation of the second finger and "Ankilose" on (or of) the right hand. Amputation
of the distal phalange of the second finger, good quality surgical stitching; an "hypocomica"
sticking (or making deeps points or deeps cuts) 12cm long between the phalanx of the third
finger with "Ankilose" (in position of the semi-flexible "palmar" of the finger).
Right lower limb: irregular "hipocimicas" scars on the back part of the thigh.
Left leg, amputation at the upper third of the thigh. Good quality surgical stitching.
"hipocomica" plate 12x6cm behind the thigh.

Legal/Medical considerations
Based on expert examination, information from the victim, the hospital and from other
sources, we conclude that the patient was the victim of a work accident which resulted in
traumatic injuries caused by an explosive agent - an anti-personnel mine.

Conclusions
The victim's injuries are stable.
The healing time for his injuries is 90 days.
It will take 180 days before he can work again.
50% probability that he will not work again.
Physiological incapacity 83%.
The "Pretium Deloris" is serious.
The injuries involve aesthetic problems.
The victim will not be able to work as a deminer again - other work must be found for him.
In November 2000 the victim was working as a photocopier operator at the demining group’s
Inhambane office.
The person who carried out an accident investigation for the National Mine Action authority
(an employee of the demining group) stated that the victim had lost an eye about two months
after the accident. The person was senior TA responsible for making decisions to improve the
safety spectacles, and this accident was influential. His timing was uncertain and so may not
conflict with the medical report where eye injury was not mentioned.
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Analysis
The primary and secondary cause of this accident are listed as “Field control inadequacy”
because the victim was breaching several SOPs and his errors were not corrected. The
investigators recognised some field control problems at the site.
The demining group’s failure to provide adequate PPE to their deminers is a fault that they
made some effort to correct during 2001.
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